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2by Reginald Herbold Green
To plan is to choose. Choose to go forward.
- J.K. Nyerere
Time past is perhaps contained in time present and. time
present in time future ... all time is irredeemable ...
- T.S. Eliot
Of Periods and Priorities
When discussing public sector strategy and tactics it is necessary 
to have three questions in mind:
1. What is necessary in terms of immediate targets?
2. How is it possible to carry out what is necessary?
3. Where will the immediate steps take one in respect to strategic 
goals, ie clearly open up new steps toward them, neutral, 
create obstacles.
These questions must be asked because time, knowledge and personnel 
will be the most valuable and scarcest resources available to 
Namibia's Party, state and public sector. If they are not asked 
bits of the presently desirable will be done, and pieces of the 
necessary left undone; the important will be attempted by impossible 
routes and the short-term will either becane a barrier to the 
long-term, or the possibilities it opens up will pass unseen and 
unused.
There is nothing abstract about these comments. First, they are 
based on twenty years of advisory and operational experience in 
African public sectors (and on what the author, now sadder, if 
perhaps not wiser, sees as his own mistakes just as much as those 
of others). Second, they relate to the concrete context of Namibia
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prior to, at and over the years immediately following independence. 
Third, because they are related to Namibia they exist in a specific 
context of ecology, political economy and history domestically and 
of geo-political relations (including, but not limited to, location) 
and the global political economic system of the last quarter of the 
twentieth century (and its present clear and continuing crisis).
Further, there are - even within this perspective - four distinct 
periods:^
1. From now until a constitutional assembly is elected;
2. from that election to independence;
3. the first eighteen months of independence;
4. the ensuing three years.
What must and what can be done within each period varies. It is no 
criticism of Towards Economic Development Strategy Options for 
Independent Namibia to warn that much of what it proposes cannot be 
implemented until after the end of the fourth period. That does not 
render it irrelevant. Technically longer-term goals and target 
frameworks are necessary if short-term decisions and actions are to 
avoid needless future costs. Politically (or more accurately 
political economically) a strategic frame must look beyond a set 
of crises and transitional periods, even though immediate .action 
within that strategy must concentrate on survival, consolidation, 
selective steps forward and working out the tactics for advances 
in the future, not an attempted leap from the present to the long­
term future ignoring intervening deserts, canyons and mountains. 
Psychologically crisis management does not afford - by itself - an 
adequate basis for mobilisation; it must be linked to fuller and
longer-term goals and "payoffs” - and, by the same token, must seek
4to include clear and present evidence of progress toward them.
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That said, one element in strategy is identifying what is to be done 
at given time periods. The following notes seek to do this in respect 
to each of the time periods and, more particularly, in respect to 
certain key themes. These do not exhaust what is desirable because 
not all that is desirable is possible. Nor do they cover routine 
activities and those (eg police, prisons, courts, security forces) 
on which the author has no expertise. There may well be ommissions 
but to be blunt, the list already errs on the side of demanding more 
than can be done. If new priorities are to be added there will have 
to be cutbacks on sane of those suggested. In no sense are the 
suggested approaches under the priorities definitive - they claim 
no more than to be apparently consistent with first steps toward 
stated SWAPO objectives and potentially feasible.
Today to Assembly: Planning and Preparation
The key constraint in this period is very limited ability to act on 
the ground in Namibia in the normal public sector (governmental and 
parastatal) sense. That will presumbably remain true even during 
the cease fire/election period (especially given the over-riding 
organisational and electoral priorities which SWAPO must place first) .
The key advantage is that there is - ironically - more time to 
reflect and to develop parameters for strategy, policy, institutions
and programmes. Later (at least until eighteen months after indepen­
dence) the need to act to deal with today will compete even more 
strongly with forming and revising medium term strategy, policy and 
institutions. This is not a very good thing - ability to test pro- 
psoals against a broad spectrum of Namibian workers and peasants 
opinion and also against concrete realities (in Namibia and in terms
of what can be negotiated/secured externally in specific areas) is
limited. But it is a thing which will be forgotten now at the cost
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of confusion and muddle later.
The priorities now are:
a. developing a strategic framework and broad lines of action 
within it;
b. articulating what the public sector must do (or is likely to 
have to do5) when and how this might be accomplished;
c. maximising buildup of Namibian personpower (the more familiar 
word manpower is deliberately not used) on a basis and time 
scale corresponding to (and checked against) the strategy 
and the initial public sector priorities;
d. systematically building up community (camp, settlement) level
experience (in services, production, organisation) not only
because it provides a foundation for future public and command/
co-operative sector action later as well as a test (which should
be used) on what is desirable and practicably as seen by
7typical Namibians ;
e. lining up particular external skills and resources - whether
in terms of individuals or states or organisations or enter­
prises - and laying a basis for speedy action, on key external
negotiations after independence.
Transitional Period
There does not appear to be a coherent, articulated view on how the 
public sector of Namibia is to operate from the election of the 
Constitutional Assembly to independence. This is not a case in which 
it is practicable, let alone wise, to let sleeping dogs lie as they
will assuredly wake up after the election and. probably prove to be
rabid.
a. to continue South African administration (even with nominal
UNTAG supervision) is implausible since the election result 
will, have repudiated them in a way quite different from the 
normal last stage colonial transition period;
nor can operation under existing laws be envisaged seriously - 
first, substantial total laws and elements in most are ob­
noxious and second, much of the legislation is suitable only 
for a semi-integrated part of South Africa, not for a separate 
territorial unit.
most evident way forward would be:
to secure for the Constitutional Assembly the power to serve 
as an interim Legislative Assembly to araend/repeat/enact as 
necessary without prejudice to the ultimate constitutional 
provisions;
in preparation therefore SWAPO (via UNIN or the Nationhood 
Programme) to secure proposed draft laws and amendments to 
fill gaps and to remove obnoxious acts/provisions; 
to secure power to the Constitutional Assembly to appoint a 
Supervisory Committee (interim cabinet) - if necessary made 
up in preportion to party representation in the Assembly - 
with powers to issue policy directives to and supervise the 
public sector (civil services and parastatals); 
to provide that the Supervisory Committee may appoint a 
limited number of "additional" senior civil servants/managers 
to each Ministry/Department/Corporation;
to identify one or more Namibians (or if necessary expatriates 
chosen by SWAPO) to serve as "policy auditors" under "d." 
and to negotiate with UNTAG for a parallel group of more 
technically specialised personnel;
under "a." and "c." to enact exchange control regulations in
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particular with respect to ail payments/transfers to South 
Africa except those for current purchases or out of current 
personal incomes, and to require separate accounting and 
management for all Namibian branches of South African para- 
statals;
g. to secure termination of all appeals from Namibian to South 
African courts as of the election date (preferably as of the 
cease fire date) and the appointment of a new "Supreme" Court 
(final appeal court) in Namibia staffed by justices nominated 
to it by the International Court of Justice;
h. to secure the appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions 
and of a Chief Parliamentary draftsman to replace the South 
African manned incumbents as of the date of the election and
to be named by the presiding judge of the ICJ and the Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth respectively.
These are in sense minimal proposals - major as they are and hard 
as they will be to negotiate. They are the minimum needed to avoid 
the systematic sabotage of the territory by the public sector, a 
massive flight of funds, and a judiciary/prosecutary process inimical 
to a smooth transition to independence. Each is - and can be shown 
to be - reasonable in constiutional, legal and administrative terms 
and the lay legal appointments are proposed to be made by persons 
(or institutions) os substance or independence. The total impact 
is somewhat analogous (although less sweeping at least in principle) 
than the 1974-75 transitional period arrangements in Mozambique.
The Intitial Days: Averting Collapse, Consolidating, Laying
F o u n d a t i o n s _____________________________________________
The first eighteen months of independence will be critical. Either 
transition to a less than perfect but working public service within
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a reasonably functioning economy will have been achievable (as in 
Zimbabwe) or the failure to achieve it (as in sane sectors in 
Mozambique) will lead to very heavy subsequent costs. The Namibian 
public service cannot singlehandedly prevent chaos and collapse 
but it can create frameworks conducive to avoiding them, and to being 
able to move promptly and decisively to fill gaps before they expand 
into gaping holes in the fabric of production, services, personnel 
or policy.
Because those gaps are predictable in the sense that there will be 
sane, but less so in the sense that some expected problems may not 
arise (eg adequate numbers of urban water and power station engineers 
may stay) and sane unanticipated (by definition not subject to 
examples!) will arise, the public service must keep a reserve of 
"top level" time and personnel available to act at once then they 
emerge. In the context of overall scarcity of personnel and of their 
time, this will be hard to achieve. But it is crucial - if all 
problems identified in advance are handled but there is nobody to 
monitor, identify, act on new ones as they emerge (before they are 
crises) much of the value of what is done will be undone.
This is the first period in which the Namibian public sector can 
address the full range of priorities adumbrated below. Range - not 
depth. In each case two questions must be asked on any particular 
action under the priority:
1. Can this be differed without a high cost?
2. If yes, what will the cost be (in terms of something else left 
undone) of doing it now.
Strict use of these criteria might preclude any medium term tactical,
institutional, planning and programme data collection, articulation 
and draft option/proposal writing (for political decision takers) 
and thus prevent maintaining momentum after consolidation was 
achieved. Therefore, on key areas forward planning units not res­
ponsible for current operations should be created - if possible with
at least a core of Namibian staff to ensure that their articulation
is consistent with, not in contrast to,medium term strategic goals.
Progress toward Medium Term Planning
With effort - and luck - by about eighteen months after independence
the transition/consolidation crisis will have been resolved and a 
more normal context for public sector operation achieved. This 
does not mean structural transformation will be complete - only the 
immediately essential bits will have been done and even their main­
tenance will require continued effort. Rather, it means that medium- 
term planning and action in greater depth and based on longer-term 
analysis and assessment will be possible because immediate threats 
to keeping the day to day operations of the public sector, the 
economy, and the society, going, have been overcome.
At this point fuller integration of the forward planning 
units into the overall decision taking and operational 
structure is needed and possible. Needed because - e.g. - 
once Walvis Bay is recovered forward port facility planning 
interacts with existing operations - and possible because - 
e.g. - until Walvis Bay is recovered the operational 
public sector concern is creating and running alternative 
ports-to avert immediate collapse or South African 
strangulation of the new state and simply does not mesh 
with five or twenty year development of Walvis Bay or
g"Kunenemund".
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Aspects of Public Sector Activity
Public Sector activity is not homogenous. There is of 
course the division between the civil service and government 
and the public operational or enterprise sectors but the 
divisions directly relevant to this paper crosscut that 
categorisation. A functional division includes:
A. Overall policy and framework formulation (e.g.incomes 
policy, foreign exchange budgeting and control);
B. Sectoral and particular policy and frameworks (e.g. 
urban planning, building codes);
C. Control (e.g. auditing of accounts, credit limitation, 
school and hospital inspection);
O. Operational activities (e.g. mineral export corporation, 
motor vehicle repaid depot, teaching);
E. Resource mobilisation and allocation (e.g. taxation, 
personpower recruitment and assignment).
Within each category there are elements which either 
cannot be performed other than by the public sector 
(e.g. exchange control) or cannot be performed elsewhere 
except by abdicating public control over key elements 
(e.g. incomes policy which can - at a price - be abdicated 
to "market forces"). There are others which it is highly 
desirable but not essential to have in the public sector 
(e.g. commercial banking) but which can under some 
circumstances be left private if adequate policy and control 
frameworks exist (e.g. in the central bank and treasury). 
Further cases are ones in which both private and public 
have at least interim roles to play (e.g. medical services, 
large ranches). Others are probably unsuitable for central 
public sector as opposed to local / communal / co-operative
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or private operation (e.g. small farming, much of retail 
trade).
There is no clear division of function by institution
e.g. a treasury is engaged in some functions of each of the 
five types-as is a state metal export corporation. There 
are differences in weighting e.g. a single regional hospital 
is largely operational but may have some sectoral policy 
and control (of other medical units) aspects.
An Aside - What to Avoid
To attempt to do slightly more than is possible is probably 
usually useful, i.e. setting a target a little beyond the 
reach of attainment leads to maximum effort. But this is 
very different from gross overloading of the public sector 
with tasks which simply cannot, even approximately, be 
performed with available resources. That leads to bad 
performance in each area and to a real danger of systemic 
collapse. For example, there is no way the public sector 
in Namibia over the period under consideration can operate
5,000 retail shops and 6,500 ranches. To attempt to do so 
will not only guarantee most run badly (or not at all) 
but will in practice cause a failure to define and control 
in terms of coherent commercial and ranching functions, 
provide supporting services and wholesale facilities and 
operate key retail or ranch units which would otherwise 
collapse - an agenda just within the limits of the possible, 
if attention and resources are not misallocated to attempting 
the patently impossible.
Co-operative, communal and neighbourhood organisation roles 
should be encouraged and given room for manoeuvre (neither 
tied down by red tape nor smothered by ill considered "help"). 
To put the public sector proper into building all or most 
new houses, running all or most shops or ranches, to 
establishing all nurseries and creches, to creating all 
or most small enterprises is madness. It is not simply 
technically unfeasible in Namibia and operationally inefficient 
but politically totally counter to encouraging active 
participation and actually (as opposed to verbally) 
mobilizing effort.
By the same token it is dangerous to take over private 
enterprises which either cannot be run (for whatever reason) 
at the time or which are of no particular priority,
100% owned, 100% self managed, 100% closed mines are 100% 
worse than 60-40 joint ventures with technical services 
contracts responsible to an alert Ministry of Mines 
with economic, safety, and geological analytical/ 
inspectorate units and selling through either a State 
Export Corporation or via a system including a state valuer. 
Taking over upper income service and trade units does not 
further any basic goal - it diverts resources and probably 
worsens services. Hairdressers and delicatessens can and 
should remain private - they are no threat to overall 
economic organisation and control, they will be run better 
(and at less scarce resource cost to the economy and the 
people) in private hands, so long as there is an upper 
income group (i.e. so long as a substantial expatriate and/or 
settler community remains) they help avert premature loss 
of skilled personnel.
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Tourism is an example of a totally non-priority area. State 
bodies can promote tourism. State corporations can provide 
competent hotel and travel services. But the only priority 
goal tourism could conceivably promote in Namibia is earned 
import capacity (i.e. net foreign exchange earnings) which - 
at least over the next decade - can be done better by public 
sector action in respect to mining, ranching, fishing and 
processing. Further the "housekeeping managers" the sector 
needs would - from a Namibian public sector point of view - 
be much better deployed to schools, hospitals and other 
public institutions with a "room and board" component. If 
a modest private sector can continue to operate well and 
good - indeed it might well be modestly encouraged - if 
not/a public sector salvage operation let alone a major 
sectoral effort would be a gross misallocation of resources.
Maintaining and Rebuilding Population
The key priorities in respect to the productive sectors will 
be to prevent major falls in production and to restor already 
lost output plus providing inputs and services to increase 
small agricultural sector production, and to render transpor­
tation less dependent on South Africa. Not all output is key 
(eg tourist hotels, small businesses serving the high income 
community) and not all losses can be prevented (eg fishing is 
largely wrecked now, the world recession has debilitated the 
smaller mines, lorries - fishing boats - cattle are likely to 
have flowed to South Africa in large numbers before independence). 
The canbined results of global stagnation and war, panic flight 
and sabotage mean that the economy will be in poorcondition 
during transition and at independence.
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Mining is critical to foreign exchange flows (earned income 
capacity), productive surplus (investment and state revenue) and, 
to a lesser degree, employment. Three companies - Consolidated 
Diamond Mines, Tsumeb and Rossing constitute over 90% of the 
sector.
In the first two cases joint ventures (state majority plus 
utilisation programmes) backed by a public sector mineral export 
company (as in Zambia and Zimbabwe) and a geological/economic 
analytical and supervisory unit in a ministry of mines appears 
workable. The same applies to minor pre-1966 mines.
Post 1966 mines - illegal from the start by international law - 
require separate consideration. The two in copper could be 
contract run from Tsumeb. Rossing - unless a contract to 
manage is to be negotiated with RTZ - will require a managing 
agent/technical partner with four characteristics:
a. not geo-politically threatening (ie not fran a great power);
b. capacble of operating mining and concentration and of
improving worker health and environmental conditions;
c. credible as a commercial venture oriented to seeing Namibia 
keeps oxide production for sale at normal prices to atomic 
electricity generation customers at or near capacity;
d. not closely linked to RTZ, South Africa or the British
Atomic Energy Authority - Nuclear Fuels complex.
By elimination, the places to look are probably France, Federal 
Germany and Sweden.
New prospecting and exploration can - probably should - be sus­
pended until Namibia can sort out geological data and the legal 
regime for prospecting-exploration. A suspension (say for the
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period up to a year after independence) on development is even 
more critical - Langer Heinrich is no exception even when taken 
over by the public sector, as in present and probable 1980's 
state of the yellowcake market it may not pay to complete it at 
an early date.
Agricultural services are the key to restoring and (for 
the small scale sector) raising output. Research, extension, 
farm planning, marketing and credit have been central to 
the large ranch sector. It is anything but an example of 
rugged individual boers - rather it is one of the world's 
most guided, serviced and cossetted rural sectors. To 
keep these services going - and to build up serious research - 
extension - input - marketing provision for the small 
farming sector and for crop production on ranches, it 
is vital to keep existing units running. This entails - 
if at all possible - negotiating at least interim (5 year?) 
contracts with most serving professional staff as well as 
training Namibians and recruiting new expatriates.
Large ranching cannot remain totally European or totally 
private. Given the dreary record of state ranches both 
in production and in participation (in Namibia they would 
look uncommonly like the status quo with expatriate managers 
replicating the old pattern - an approach likely to have 
very high political costs) and the total impracticability 
of small scale ranching at anything like present production/ 
employment levels - the goal should be communal/co-operative 
ranches in the hands of present ranch workers plus their 
families with state ranches basically an emergency holding 
device for abandoned ranches whose workers are not yet 
organised to run them. Because ranch workers are used to
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production team (not household) work organisation and 
are on the ranches the key "normal" problems to creating 
communal resettlement villages do not arise. If services 
can. be maintained and brief skill upgrading courses held 
for experienced workers (some of whom are de facto deputy 
managers) substantial output maintenance and fairly speedy 
recovery should be possible plus a build-up of crop and 
dairy production backed by altered price incentives and 
utilizing the increase in labour power resulting from 
recruiting families.
Early announcement of fairly generous compensation for 
improvements, workable assets (especially cattle, lorries, 
machinery), handing over ranches in working order, staying 
as interim manager (or owner in some cases) would help 
both in averting Angola-Mozambique type settler panic flight 
and sabotage and in phasing departures over four to six 
years so transition is consistent with consolidation.
Until carrying capacity pasture maintenance and related 
issues are better known/controlled stock levels should be 
forbidden to exceed those of the late 1970's.
Small farming in the relevant period requires support on a 
primarily household production/communal infrastructural 
investment (e.g. feeder roads, water supplies, woodlots, 
godowns) basis. These must be backed by supporting services, 
marketing, small scale irrigation (large scale will take 
longer only mo ving to detailed studies and initial works 
construction can be accomplished before near the end of 
the relevant periods) and price incentives (if necessary 
including production subsidies) are needed for three
reasons: to raise small farmer incomes, to set in motion a dynamic 
toward food self-sufficiency, to avert a rush of small farming house­
holds to non-existent urban jobs and already overstrained urban 
services.
Much fuller discussion appears in UNIN's agricultural mongraph 
(Mshonga) and options paper, Chambers and Green's chapter in Namibia: 
the last Colony and a forthcoming Catholic Institute for International 
Relations monograph (Moorsom). The need now is to reach decisions 
on medium-term strategy (SWAPO), identify priorities (SWAPO/technical 
support) and begin to articulate resource requirements and programmes 
to implement them.
Fisheries will require a salvage operation. Very few vessels are 
likely to remian at independence. The first steps will probably 
need to be contract fishing to supply local tinneries (once Walvis 
Bay is recovered) paralleled by a study on sustainable yields and 
contracts to procure replacement vessels,and train Namibians to 
operate them.
Transport faces immediate priorities. Procuring replacement lorries 
and buses (and possibly planes if Namib Air chooses to fly away) 
during the transition period. Creating non-South African linked 
enterprises (plural) to operate them whether purely public sector, 
with technical assistance (eg from African haulage companies like 
ZTRS and treindly country co-op hauliers) or joint ventures with 
external (or small local capitalist) partners. Ensuring that rail­
way rolling stock and personnel do not all race off to Upington and 
points South, that replacement needs are identified and procured 
(negotiations during transition, delivery as soon after independence 
as possible) and that maintenance facilities are created to remove
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dependence on Upington and Cape Town. That if - as seems likely - 
Walvis Bay is still occupied at independence, alternative port 
facilities are planned now, designed and negotiated during transition, 
put into place during and just after transition. The key programme 
is probably dredging, lighter and crane procurement, artificial 
breakwater building (sinking old ships about to be scrapped), estab­
lishing an oil depot (a permanently moored tanker) and upgrading
9railway sidings and godowns at Swakopmund. Unless these priorities
can be met the entire movement.of goods (and therefore their produc­
tion and government revenue, foreign exchange earnings, food supply, 
public services) will become erratic (or worse).
Communications priorities centre on keeping posts-radio-telegraphy 
working (training courses plus selected expatriates) and augmenting 
facilities by temporary radio telephone links as well as delinking 
international conmunications from South Africa by building a ground 
satellite station. Power includes similar considerations in respect 
to Escom including completing Ruacana Falls ancilliary facilities 
and transmission line.
Water priorities in the first months centre on maintaining urban 
supplies and expanding them to meet the demand imposed by "ending 
contract". In parallel a small-scale rural water (human, livestock, 
spot irrigation) programme is needed to improve rural access especially 
in the North.
Commerce is an area for selective action. Export marketing must 
either be in the public sector or subject to independent price 
verification (eg an independent valuer in a renegotiated CSO marketing 
agreement in diamonds possibly using the Tanzania valuation office 
on a contract basis). Basic imports probably should be handled at
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least in large measure by one or two public sector majority joint 
ventures with friendly country co-operative or medium-scale private 
import/export houses. This is critical as present importers have 
in many cases little capacity to identify low cost sources (or any 
sources) globally - they order from South Africa only. A public 
sector presence (to provide a check to exploitation and a capacity 
to fill gaps) in wholesaling will also be a priority - again needing 
either technical or partnership contracts with external firms (co-op, 
state or private and - where appropriate - African or Asian).
Retailing - except perhaps for a few large urban stores and conceivably 
an urban areas chain - is best left to the co-op/communal and private 
sectors with training/financial backing for the former, and some 
controls to prevent gross exploitation (but not interminable red 
tape on licensing, nor exclusion from areas or products before 
adequate communal/public alternatives exist, which they rarely will 
in the periods under consideration) by the latter.
Nationalisation/conpensation priorities are as much practical as 
normative over the next five years:
a. colonial government and colonial state corporation assets (by 
precedent with no compensation);
b. abandoned property (minimal compensation);
c. land and mineral title (separate from use rights which need to 
be renegotiated rather than acquired en bloc at these stages) 
without compensation;
d. at least 50% interest in key mines (minimal cash compensation);
e. selected other enterprises which perform key roles (or threaten 
for whatever reason to stop performing them I ) and for which 
creating new public sector alternatives is not immediately 
practical (reasonable compensation);
f. phased acquisition of improvements, fixed assets, moveable assets
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(eg herds, vehicles, machinery) on ranches (reasonable compen­
sation) ;
g. post-1966 mines (no or no substantial compensation) .
Certain problems arise - external loans (eg to ESCOM, Rossing) from 
financial institutes (especially non-South African ones) should 
probably be serviced and repaid. "SWA-Namibia" borrowings from 
non-territorial sources should be repudiated as under the 1971 ICJ 
opinion they are clearly illegal. Where limited payments ensure 
smooth transition on a going concern basis as opposed to a closure 
before takeover or actual sabotage,these need to be considered 
pragmatically (if also sceptically).10
Services; Present and Future
Existing services - especially health and education - need to be 
kept going as a basis for achieving their transition to access and 
roles appropriate to a liberated Namibia not first allowed to dis­
integrate. This applies to private (and especially to public sector 
subsidised church and non-European voluntary agency services) services 
as well as public.11 (It does not apply to the present "security" 
services nor to "native" and "homeland" administration which are not 
services at all, but naked tools of oppressive coercion). To do this 
requires retaining and retraining existing personnel and recruiting 
and new (see, eg, UNIN's monograph on education and on
language).
However, immediate action on transformation does have priority along 
several lines:
a. removing all racial barriers to access and - at least in public
and church institution cases all economic barriers excluding
12workers and peasants - within days of independence at the
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latest;
b. establishment of a programme (and first major steps to implement 
it) of basic education (primary and adult), primary health care 
(preventitive and health education as well as curative) and 
access to pure water (probably often by communal or neighbour­
hood taps) for all Namibians with special attention to rural 
areas;
c. buildup of urban services linked to the requirements of popula­
tion movement on "ending contract" and of women (see separate 
section below);
d. mass English language education;
e. emergency, large scale, skill upgrading courses to permit
20,000 or more experienced Namibian workers to fill the gaps
in their ability to handle semi-skilled, artisanal, secretarial/ 
clerical/book-keeping, supervisory, para-professional (eg ex­
tension officer) and professional (eg nurses, primary school - 
adult education teachers) posts. This is the first step toward 
broadly based Namibianisation of production and services 
provision.
These priorities seem clear, and therefore to need articulation,
programme and resource need identification and resource mobilisation.
Beyond them more detailed studies of priorities, sequences, ways and
means are needed. These probably cannot - except as gaps emerge in
the list of what is immediately necessary - be implemented until the
12close of the consolidation period but they need to be decided upon 
and organised for implementation then to maintain a forward dynamic.
Basic Personal Needs and Income Distribution
Key goods (eg basic foods including those needed for improved diet) 
and purchased services (eg transport) as well as basic public services
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(eg education) need to be identified and requirements quantified.
This is critical to selecting areas for priority attention to 
maintaining /expanding production, strengthening distribution, filling 
gaps by imports and - if necessary and feasible - instituting price 
management to avoid excess profits (while preserving adequate sur­
pluses in production and margins in transport and distribution). It 
is important that - eg - hoes, roofing sheet, salt, fish, coooking 
oil, grain-meal-flour^-^ugar, cotton prints and drills, probably beer 
and cigarettes, radios, bicycles, needles and thread, matches, soap 
be available in rural shops (co-op, ranch, private, village) at 
reasonable prices and - eg - that buses exist at predictable times 
and places convenient to rural residents. To ensure that it happens 
requires knowing what, where and how much, so that production, trade 
and other programmes and policies can pay special attention to these 
basic needs.
However, no amount of attention to adequate supplies of goods/services 
at non-exhorbitant prices in shops/places accessible to the consumer 
will allow basic personal needs to be met until income distribution 
is altered especially in respect to raising incomes of Namibian 
workers and peasants.
The employment and agricultural self-employment aspects of such 
changes or income distribution are noted below, But several incomes 
policy or relative remuneration issues arise:
a. minimum and middle wages(for non-white Namibians) need to be 
raised to cover minimum socially acceptable household cost of 
living;
b. a non-racial salary scale for the public sector (including joint 
ventures) needs to be formulated promptly;
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c. both wages and salaries must be well below present European 
rates - Namibia cannot afford to consolidate labour payments at 
the white rates;
d. the phasing of increases must relate to capacity to pay - wiping 
out poductive sector surpluses would cripple taxation and invest­
ment as well as production and employment;
e. the radical reduction of present wages/salaries for settlers is 
not possible, at least in the short run, without most of those 
whose services are most needed leaving - possibly paying the 
unified scale or a frozen present rate, whichever was greater, 
and placing all employees taking the second option on term con­
tracts might serve;
f. new expatriates can be served only at the going rate for their 
services at income plus some (say 15-20%) incentive to face the 
extra problems of serving away from home - a problem at least 
theoretically soluble by inducement of expatriate allowances
on term contracts.
while ad hoc and interim decisions can buy time they cannot produce 
even interim ansers to incomes policy questions. The most appropriate 
approach may be a special body like Zimbabwe's Riddell Commission 
with members and a secretariat possessing varied expertise to hold 
hearings, collect data, analyse, propose alternatives in respect to 
wages, salaries, prices to the political decision takers after 
six to eight months.
Personnel and Employment
Broad personnel requirements have been identified in UNIN's Manpower 
Estimates and Development Implications study. Substantial training 
- broadly consistent with, albeit much smaller than the projected 
needs - is underway through SWAPO and Nationhood Programme projects.
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The immediate requirements appear to include:
a. using analogue (parallel institutions in other African countries), 
direct (where Namibian data are to hand), or indirect (where 
other methods fail) estimates of key institutional and sectoral 
requirements in more detail. One case of each (central bank,, 
posts and telecommunications, foreign service respectively) was 
done by UNIN in 1977-78 and basic data for forty-odd analogue 
studies collected. Either UNIN or SWAPO should reactivate work
on these lines;
b. on the basis of the refined requirements assess how far present 
programmes go toward meeting them, and what can be done to 
expand them;
c. plan (and where possible, test - eg camps) upgrading programmes 
for, eg, experienced ranch or mine workers or medical assistants 
who will need at independence to be trained to fill middle-level 
/semi-skilled/supervisory posts;
d. develop and test (eg, in camps) programmes to teach English 
quickly to many people and to teach teachers to make the decision 
to make English Namibia's lingua franca and official language 
effective.
During transition more action (using real Namibian data in cal­
culation) in all four points becomes possible with the last two 
moving toward full-scale operation. Employees - especially large 
ones - must be required to provide released time, and on the job, 
teaching in respect to skill upgrading, literacy and English.
Expatriate procurement will pose serious operational problems:
a. lay, policy-oriented position posts should be filled either by
individuals identified by SWAPO or by ones interviewed by SWAPO;
b. other posts should be filled only after at least a brief examina­
tion of the qualifications of proposed candidates (interviews
for all are not practicable given numbers needed);
c. standby arrangements for identified key personnel from specific
sources should be negotiated before independence to allow timely 
arrival;
d. a unit to evaluate all requests for, recruitment and contractual 
arrangement in respect to and allocation of expatriates must be
13set up with a Namibian head and experienced professional staff.
It should, where feasible, delegate handling of details after 
approval of numbers, types, source to the Namibian institution 
to use them _if this will save time.
There are two problems to be faced. First, getting enough expatriate 
experts for the actual jobs requiring them on time will be hard. 
Adequate personnel are scarce, recruitment is usually slow. Second, 
hordes of individuals and agencies will offer themselves and their 
personnel for a wide array of reasons and many of the personnel 
proposed will be irrelevant, unsuitable, or worse. "Have a headache, 
take two expatriates" is not a good working model, especially as it 
leads to often having the wrong expatriates in the wrong posts.
The severe shortage of middle-level, skilled and professional 
personnel will be paralleled by an employment problem. The self- 
employment half turns primarily in speedy action to make small 
agricultural household access to incomes and public services adequate 
to avert massive population movements other than those resulting 
from "ending contract" and secondarily on facilitiating co-op/ 
communal self-employment (eg in construction). The wage part requires 
adequate ranch wages/access to services to avert a loss of their 
(needed) experienced labour force and a systematic identification of
ways to build up productive wage employment. Sane preliminary 
indications of possible priorities and programme opportunities 
appear in the UNIN person-power study cited, but require further 
articulation at least during the transitional period.
"Ending Contract” - Liberating Women
"Ending Contract" implies more than changes in terms and conditions 
of employment. It implies reuniting of households probably at the 
workplace of the wage employed member. That is likely to mean that 
up to 100,000 Namibians move to ranches and up to 250,000 to urban/ 
mining areas within the periods covered by this paper - a movement 
of over a fifth of the total population within five years of the 
elections.
These population shifts must form the basis for urban planning and 
for housing policy as well as a locational framework for service 
provision. Basic urban and general services (sites, roads, water, 
open spaces, schools, clinics, buses, places for shops and service 
establishments and churches) must be a key urban development 
priority. Early mapping out of the approximate location and timing 
of moves will be critical in the transitional and immediate post­
independence months.
Housing is a priority in a different way. Maximum encouragement 
(including access to finance, construction materials and training 
as well as abolition of building codes tied to European standards 
and/or bureaucratic inertia) to self-help and co-op/communal/ 
small private building is needed. Neither the public nor even 
the private modern building sector can possibly construct the 
houses in time or at acceptable (to residents or the Treasury's 
need to maintain domestic balance) cost levels. The alternative 
to decentralized communal/private building of units acceptable to 
residents is not better quality, public sector housing estates.
It is a bankrupt housing corporation, inadequate numbers of public 
sector houses allocated in criteria doing little for public morale 
or morality and miles of unplanned, unsanitary, unserviced shacks
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like those of Mathare Valley outside Nairobi or Dakar's satellite 
town of Pekine. Some of these issues are discussed in Manpower 
Estimates and Development Implications and in UNIN's housing 
study, but more articulation and testing of proposals is needed.
"Ending contract" will either massively advance the liberation of 
women or massively increase their subordination. The women who 
move will have been productively employed (self-employed) in a 
social context (however unsound) they know. In the new environment 
(whether ranch or urban) they can have better access to services 
but unless priority is given to seeing that they are given access 
to new forms of productive employment (not limited to household 
work nor traditional unskilled employment) and to new ways of 
social organisation and interaction, they will be even more 
subordinated economically and much more alienated and isolated 
socially than before.
A number of issues, priorities and programmes in this area have 
been outlined in Manpower (sic) Estimates and in a Catholic 
Institute of International Relations monograph by C. Allison.
But these lack concrete interaction with Namibian women in a 
Namibian context while SWAPO1s Women's Council has to date not 
had the time and personnel (nor the requisite access to women in 
Namibia) to outline an overall approach, articulate priorities, 
identify required public sector action and organise women to 
liberate themselves in concrete ways related to production, 
learning and social relations in ranching and urban areas.
Doing that is a priority for the Women's Council - especially 
during the transitional period - and one for which they have a 
need to be allocated professional assistance (from SWAPO sectoral 
units or technical assistance) as and when they require it.
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Some Institutional Issues
General models for institutions are rarely applicable with much 
precision to any actual institutions. Indeed institutional 
design is normally best seen as a part of sectoral strategy - policy - 
programme design not as a separate sector. What follows here are 
therefore a few notes on elements which should form part of the 
context and framework of most institutions, not a diagram for any 
institution.
Participation in decision taking - including coherent explanations 
on the limits of the possible - is critical. This applies to 
workers'councils Cat workplace and at institutional level in 
government as well as public enterprises) but also more broadly 
to consumers (again of public services as well as products of 
public enterprises). Some consultations clearly must go via the 
Party and government, but many can and should be between, eg. 
agricultural extension staff and peasants or post office employees 
and letter writers and recipients (or non-recipients) to discuss 
quantity, quality, makeup and satisfaction from services with a 
view to seeing what can be done about it.
Decentralisation is a necessary - though never a sufficient - 
condition for broad participation. Unless people can see public 
sector employees with some power to alter the programmes directly 
affecting them, they cannot participate. If all decision taking 
civil servants and managers are in central Windhoek offices only 
a narrow elite with time and money (and skill at getting past 
doormen, receptionists and secretaries) can participate. One 
aspect of decentralisation is coordination at "regional" (eg. 
Kaiokoueld, Kunene, Kavango-West Caprivi, East Caprivi, Tsumeb- 
Otavi-Grostfontein, Okahandja-Gobabis (North Central), Rehoboth-
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Mariental (South Central) South, Walvis Bay-Swakopomund-Rossing,
Luderitz,Oranjemund, Windhoek Metropolitan) level. This requires
somewhat similar decentralisation within ministries, departments,
enterprises, whose activities affect people's day to day lives,
some regional policy and planning capacity and regional development
14advisory committees reflecting community and interest groups 
(women, workers, co-op members, villagers, churches, small 
businesses, major public and private employers, etc). However, 
ten full-scale regional civil service centres cannot possibly be 
staffed during the consolidation period so coordination, not full- 
scale regional planning and administration, must be the central 
operative principle.
Decentralisation is possible only if major policies and programmes 
are set out clearly through the political and public sector 
technical/managerial process. Only then can sub-units know 
what goals and guidelines must be pursued, why and what alterations 
and modifications are either within the sub-units' power to make 
or likely to be approved if proposed to central units.
Law should constitute a reflection of national socio-political 
and political economic values (ie a set of norms) as well as a 
set of standards against which to test actual or projected actions 
and a central frame to sanction improper conduct. It is of 
course not the only central frame - internal regulations of the 
public sector merge almost imperceptibly into administrative law.
Law should not be primarily a matter for courts. As a set of 
norms or standards for conduct and as an ex ante (before the 
event) control frame laws and the law fail every time a criminal, 
civil or administrative case has to go to court. Legal education
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(for professionals, para-professionals and "consumers") is one 
route to strengthening the non-court (success story) side of the 
law and laws. One element is to convince the public sector 
that a) administrative law is the servant of public policy and 
programmes - if it truly impedes them it can and should be 
amended, but b) until it is amended it should be obeyed not 
ignored. The public sector should set an example of being law 
abiding.
Namibia faces severe problems in respect to the law and laws.
The inherited image of the legal system and many laws is one of 
oppression and exploitation. Rewriting the laws, explaining 
them intelligibly (in terms of why they are needed not just what 
they require or forbid) and rapidly changing public sector legal 
personnel (judges, prosecutors, draftsmen, contract negotiators) 
are priorities if laws and the law are to become understood, 
respected and obeyed.
Fiscal and Monetary Affairs
Namibia requires the ability to mobilize and allocate domestic 
monetary savings and credit. That requires a central bank and 
either public sector (51% or more ownership plus operating 
control) or closely regulated (by central bank) private commercial 
banks and insurance companies, plus specialized public sector 
provident/pension funds and investment banks.
To operate such domestic credit budgeting requires exchange control 
which is operable only with an independent national currency, ie. 
the "Namib" must succeed the Rand as soon as practicable. Further 
the probable scarcity of foreign exchange and certain need to 
control capital outflows and transfer pricing indicates that foreign
■ _  29 _
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exchange budgeting, import licensing and remittance licensing 
will be necessary.
South Africa is not in general a low cost source of imports.
Its indirect tax structure is not (cannot be) related to Namibian 
goals. Therefore, Namibia needs to leave the South African 
Customs Union. Indirect taxes should be set on the primary 
criteria of raising revenue and of being progressive (ie low on 
goods which bulk large in low income budgets and high in luxuries) 
and the secondary one of selectively encouraging domestic 
production (which can often be partly or fully done by import 
licensing, purchase contracts, bloc payments in support of 
investment as well as or rather than taxation). The basic 
indirect tax should be a simple, once for all sales tax (on the 
East African model).
Direct taxes (including royalties and export duties) need to be 
set to maximise revenue consistent with providing adequate 
incentives to production (private or public enterprise or peasant) 
and to avoiding giving incentives, ecological abuse and resource 
non use (eg abandoning low grade mineral reserves, not cutting 
lower quality timber). They must therefore be designed on a 
case by case basis (eg personal income, company, diamonds, uranium, 
other minerals, other natural resources).
Power to pass on parastatal annual budget (plan) making and to 
monitor performance, (physical and financial) is also critical to 
effective fiscal operations as well as to general public enterprise 
sector efficiency. Unlike the planning/preparation of the tax 
structure, but like credit and foreign exchange budgeting, it 
requires a substantial (perhaps 20 in Namibia) professional cadre
with analytical competence and experience in accounting, applied 
economic analysis and management.
Expenditure control requires that the Treasury budget section 
understand the substance (not just the accounting) of ministerial 
departmental, regional proposals and the relation between outputs 
sought, inputs required and financial provisions. It also 
requires ongoing contact with spending bodies including - but not 
limited to - expenditure reports monthly, not over two weeks in 
arrear. To achieve this again requires a substantial (10
initially?) cadre of professionals who know financial management 
and learn about the spending bodies with whom they deal.
External finance (analysis of need, identification of sources, 
negotiation, expedition of release, monitoring of use) and 
auditing (for government and public enterprise accounts) are 
other critical Treasury priority areas. (The auditing ones 
should probably be in an independent department and a parastatal 
corporation respectively). They too require specialized, 
professional staff at least a core of them with prior experience.15
External Economic Relations
Beyond negotiations and arrangements at enterprise level, Namibia 
will need to decide on its relationships with several international 
economic or technic/economic organisations soon after independence. 
The most critical appear to include:
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e. SADCC (yes);
f. ACP (given the fact that ACP membership does not seem to
alter state policy, ie. it is serviceable to self reliance
oriented African states, does provide access to some resources 
and is needed to secure a beef quota, probably yes);
g. CMEA (problematic as basically an industrial economy plan 
coordination body centered on East Central Europe with, to 
date, inadequate modifications to render it really suitable 
for pre-industrial southern economies);
h. IMF/World Bank (problematic - useful for resource mobilisation,
dangerous to states allowing themselves to arrive at a position 
in which massive transfers from these bodies are vital because 
of their ability at that stage to impose broad political
economic conditions - probably yes, once how to avoid
overdependence after joining is articulated);
i. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs - requires further 
study;
j. South Atlantic fishing convention - now are probably needed
to limit and allocate catch and to ease enforcement of 100 
mile economic zone;
k. Waters conventions with Botswana, Angola and - if possible -
with Lesotho (where Orange River rises), South Africa;
1. East and Central African Preferential Trade Area - dependent
on its ratification by Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe (none of 
which has signed to date) and on evaluation of whether its 
provisions are consistent with Namibian national goals and 
SADCC commitments.
Each of these organisations will take up time and personnel - first
to collect data to determine whether membership is advisable, 
negotiate accession and then to use membership. To be a member 
of a body without participating - at least on issues key to 
Namibia - is not likely to be very useful.
Namibia - as a territory or more commonly as an annex to South 
Africa - is a member of a range of international organisations 
and a party to a number of international agreements. In some 
cases continued membership/participation is desirable. Reviewing 
to take decisions will take time. As a holding operation a 
variant of the procedure used by Tanzania in 1961 ("Nyerere Doctrind ) 
might be useful:
a. declare right of Namibia to abrogate, withdraw, not continue 
in membership at any time up to five years after independence;
b. maintain membership/participation in force ad interim (including 
whatever rights arise) until a formal announcement of withdrawal/ 
abrogation is given;
16c. systematically sort out the individual cases at technical level 
with reports on potential commitments, duties, obligations, 
rights and rewards to political decision takers to allow 
arriving at definitive settling of this "inheritance" within - 
say - three years of independence.
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Forward Planning - Marketing Out Ways Ahead
It was suggested above that a series of special forward 
planning units - free of day to day responsibility - 
would be needed to ensure that when consolidation was 
achieved there would be a data - analysis - options 
on which decisions as to the next round of priorities 
to sustain advance could be taken and acted upon. Some of 
the areas in which this is most vital are:
a. Small scale agriculture including irrigation, seed 
improvement, use, of improved implements and animal power, 
crop combinations and rotations, supporting services, 
communal organisations, building up community based skills 
(eg. first aid, agricultural practices, construction, imple­
ment and vehicle maintenance, accounting and record keeping), 
soil fertility and use of fertiliser;
b. Large scale agriculture including permanent ecosystem 
defence (anti-desertification), desert retrieval (eg. grass/ 
tree planting), carrying capacity determination, range 
management, small (eg. borehole, spring, check dam) and large 
scale irrigation, arable crop development, construction and 
non-agricultural economic activities;
c. Mining including building up Namibianisation of ownership 
and all phases of operation through external sales, possible 
further processing potential, optimal use of existing mine
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reserves, systematic prospecting - exploration (including 
private sector) desirable timing of new mine development, 
contract negotiation models and procedures, mining sector 
legislation;
d. Fishing including determination of long term inshore and 
economic zone sustainable yield and means to develop a 
Namibian capacity to protect and harvest (possibly with some 
quota allocation to other states, especially Botswana), 
optimal processing and export strategies, ways and means of 
expanding local availability (including fresh water fishing 
development);
e. Water including a complete survey of local resources and 
means/costs to capture and distribute water, proposals for 
allocation of major resources (especially border river supplies) 
by sector and area, negotiation of water rights agreements on 
border rivers;
f. Energy including hydroelectric, coal, natural gas (although
I
its probable main uses would be chemical production), oil 
(including a strategy for concluding prospecting - exploration - 
development agreements on the most favourable terms such as 
those of the last two Tanzanian agreements - but also including 
a preliminary assessment of prospects)^ wood (the basic rival 
fuel) and charcoal (a suitable urban fuel unless and until 
kerosine and/or "bottled gas" is locally produced).
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g. Education and personpower development with special emphasis 
on middle level personpower continuing adult education, in 
service (including enterprise) training and providing skills 
to members of communal/co-op groups (to reduce dependence on 
"outside" public sector "experts");
h. Health including first aid, health education, nutrition 
including building up production and distribution of appro­
priate foods), child and mothercare, family spacing, 
personnel development (including part-time and volunteer 
"first aiders);
i. Management including accounting, control budgeting, financial 
planning, production planning, maintenance, storage with 
emphasis on workable institutional structures, accountability 
(including to workers councils) and personnel development;
j. Technology with special attention to operation, maintenance, 
reproduction, adaptation, selection, bargaining in the context 
of institutional and personnel requirements and of identifying 
a limited number of areas in which in depth research and 
development is appropriate because no basically useable tech­
nologies to impart, master and adopt appear to be available;
k. Commerce with particular reference to effective, low cost 
domestic and effective, high return external marketing systems, 
and their information, personnel, institutional requirements;
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1. Transport including the best road-rail mix (possible 
northern extension of rail ? abandonment of rail south of 
Mariental?) links to neighbours (eg Trans-Kalahari to 
Botswana, highway or conceivably rail link to Angola),
Walvis Bay medium term development, northern port (?), 
secondary and feeder (possibly locally built and main­
tained) location and engineering issues,domestic and 
regional airservice (including freight) and long distance 
airfreight service, coastal and (perhaps in partnership 
with Botswana-Angola ?) deep sea shipping;
m. Industry concentrating on small scale, basic goods pro­
duction support in production and marketing (co-op/communal 
sector) pre-export processing and partial manufacture, import 
production for construction-mining-fishing agriculture, selected 
large scale ventures in SADCC context (ex possible cement 
"joint venture" with Botswana and/or fertiliser or chemical 
production based on natural gas and/or coal).
n. Overall economic and political economic analysis on eg. 
external and internal balance, medium term budgeting targets, 
sectoral growth and interaction (integration);
o. Legal systems including not simply laws but access to the 
legal system and to understanding of the law and laws;
p. Negotiating capacity including data collection, analysis and actual 
negotiating tactics to enhance performance at the international 
economic relations level (eg. technology transfers, transfer 
pricing, joint ventures, service contracts,construction contracts, 
mining and mineral prospecting/exploration agreements.
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In Beginning
This paper has sought to bring out a sense of urgency - decisions 
on priorities for public sector action need to be taken now so 
capacity can be built up and resources allocated to meeting them.
It has also sought to make clear the need for ruthless 
selectivity - only the necessary (not also the desireable) can 
be accomplished and what is deferrable for later action should 
in general be deferred.
Namibia is ecologically, technically and economically an unfor­
giving land. Neither Namibia's enemies nor Namibians will be 
forgiving of serious public sector mistakes and the inter­
national economic environment (as well as the Southern African 
geopolitical area) are hostile and unforgiving. Whatever the 
intent,trying to do too much, too unselectively leads to serious 
mistakes which remain mistakes and have to be paid for, however 
meritorious the attempted goals.
Over time the limits of the possible will broaden if - and only 
if - initial attention is concentrated on avoiding breakdowns, 
consolidating, seeking to achieve the most critical breakthroughs. 
Certain priorities can be identified now and - if possible - agreed 
upon so that they can be articulated in more detail, decided 
on (by SWAPO) and resources mobilised/allocated toward 
fulfilling them.
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This paper is not definitive for several reasons. It is an 
adviser's paper - written in the context of SWAPOfe stated 
goals but not by a political decision taking group. It is 
incomplete - the author is not expert in any and all fields 
and space/time are limited. Parts of it are wrong 
(unfortunately the author cannot say which) because data is 
incomplete/erroneous and because the contexts of the future can 
never be projected perfectly in advance.
What it is - or is advanced in the hopes that it may become - 
is an input into a process of priority selection and articula­
tion leading to resource mobilisation/allocation to meet the 
agreed priorities.
It is in that sense that it concludes "In Beginning" since if 
the paper is a self-contained end in itself its value is 
nonexistent.
La lutta continua - Venceremos.
Notes
The echo of Comrade President Machel's statement that the 
first day of independence is the first day of the longer 
and harder struggle for economic independence and develop­
ment is deliberate.
Professor Green has been a student and practitioner of the 
political economy of African countries since 1960 and a 
supporter of Southern African liberation efforts since 
1955. He has written extensively on Namibia since 1977.
While he has been a consultant to SWAPO and UNIN as well 
as involved in IDS (Sussex), C11R and WCC programmes relat­
ing to Namibia and is a SADCC Liaison Committee member the 
analysis and views expressed in this paper are his personal 
responsibility and not necessarily those of any of the 
groups/institutions with or for whom he has worked.
The assumed pattern includes an election for a constitutional 
assembly and a transitional period along the lines now being 
negotiated. Some type of transitional period is likely under 
any probable transition to independence scenario.
This is not to underplay the need to deliver clear gains as 
soon as possible.
Part of the requirements will flow not from any logical public 
sector extension scenario but from gaps created by colonial 
state, colonist and external enterprise departures. 
Decentralised public sector is referred to here and throughout 
the paper as cooperative/communal to distinguish it from the 
larger more formally organised national public sector.
Learning - and seeking to act on - what peásants and workers 
know and want is - unfortunately - not a common characteristic 
of intellectuals, technocrats and public servants (even, 
indeed often especially, radical ones). It is time consuming 
and hard but failure to do it usually involves high technical, 
production, real resource and political costs.
"Kunenemund" stands for a northern port - the exact site 
cannot be evaluated let alone determined until after indep­
endence .
To discuss this openly is not to aid South Africa. The 
sooner RSA sees that Namibia can and will bypass Walvis Bay 
the sooner it will agree to abandon what will then be an 
unprofitable colonial enclave with a decreasing nuisance 
value. Postponing discussion and technical planning (the latter 
cannot be kept secret) has costs for Namibia and Namibians, 
eg a moderate payment to RTZ to run Rossing for six months 
and hand over to a new management in an orderly manner may be 
in the Namibian peopled interest. This has nothing to do 
with the clearly unlawful basis of the project best described 
as a Vorster-Benn-Duncan "compact” to lengthen and intensify 
the exploitation of the people of Namibia to bolster South 
Africa's security, the UR power consumer's access to cheap 
electricity and RTZ's profits.
The route to "taking over" such services should not be by 
ending funding or help with recruitment for the true voluntary 
sector (largely church) but by creating broader management 
committees (with user majorities), ensuring equal rights of 
access, eventually transforming into public sector bodies 
(not necessarily fully even within a decade judging by 
Tanzanian experience).







Private medical practice is a special case. It can provide a 
"safety valve" for the high income minority, who will in many 
cases refuse to stay if the only medical care available is 
uniform, universal access public sector services, which cannot 
be of industrial economy standards for financial and personnel 
reasons. Zimbabwe experience in radically transforming the 
public health services while allowing the upper income minority 
to "buy more" if they wished is relevant. Tanzania's abolition 
of profit-making (not non-profit voluntary agency nor employment 
unit based) health care is relevant in the medium term, but it 
was not practicable until fifteen years after independence, and 
was in the context of a much smaller expatriate community.
Indeed, universal access to primary and adult education, basic 
health services and access to pure water themselves cannot be 
fully attained until five years (at the most optimistic - more 
realistically probably ten) after independence. Tanzania has 
given top priority to these goals and may meet the education 
one in 1985, the health one by 1990 and the water one in 1995 
(independence was in 1961). Namibia can learn from experience, 
and may suffer lesser financial constraints, but personnel and 
institutional development cannot be speeded up to instantaneous 
by throwing money and expatriates at problems (often quite the 
reverse).
These are posts needing Namibian interviewing and selection. 
Ideally the experienced professionals would be from similar 
posts in African states (and themselves African) but expertise 
is as essential as goodwill and commitment.
These are not here viewed as political units - let alone ethnic. 
The suggested regions are geographic/ecological and the case 
for decentralisation is functional and participational.
Here some expatriates with experience within aid agencies
(interviewed and selected by Namibia) can be useful. They under­
stand how these agencies operate- better than outsiders, and -
almost by definition - those who have worked only on the
recipient side are outsiders.
This requires not only lawyers (to identify formal obligations 
and rights) but also substantive specialists to indicate what 
the objective meaning of the agreements is for the sectors 
of the economy - polity - society affected.
